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Until recently, dominant local telephone companies were prohibited
from providing video programming to subscribers in their telephone
service areas. A series of court cases has changed all that, striking down
47 U.S.C. § 533(b) and the corresponding Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) regulations' (collectively, the "telco-cable cross-
ownership ban") as placing an impermissible burden on the telephone
companies' First Amendment rights.2
This article is a survey of the law regarding the federal government's
ability to regulate a telephone company's provision of video program-
ming to subscribers in its service area. Part I of the article is a history of
the telco-cable cross-ownership ban. Part II is an analysis of the cases
striking down the ban, exploring the rationale of these cases on a con-
solidated basis. Part III is a summary of the applicable standards by
which to evaluate future attempts by Congress or the FCC to regulate
telephone companies' provision of video programming.
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Chicago, Illinois. The views ex-
pressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom or its members.
1. 47 C.F.R. § 63.54-.58 (1993).
2. US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379 (9th Cir. Dec. 30,
1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994);
Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. MI1. 994); BellSouth Corp. v. United
States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. 93-323-P-C
(D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); United States Tel. Ass'n v. United States, No. 1:94CV01961 (D.D.C.
Feb. 13, 1995); Southwestern Bell Corp. v. United States, No. 3:94-CV-0193-D (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 27, 1995). See also Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, No. 94-16064, 1994 WL
719063 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1994).
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I. HISTORY OF THE TELCO-CABLE CROSS-OWNERSHIP BAN
A. The FCC Origins of the Ban
In 1969, cable television (then known as Community Antenna Tele-
vision or CATV) was subscribed to by about six percent of the
population3 and mainly carried broadcast signals via coaxial cable to re-
mote areas afflicted with poor television broadcast reception or no
reception at all.4 Telephone companies were well-positioned to provide
cable television facilities, as coaxial cables could be run along existing
telephone poles to each subscriber's home. The FCC required telephone
companies to obtain section 214 certification5 prior to the provision of
video transport to any CATV company.' When the section 214 applica-
tions indicated that many of the telephone companies had ownership in-
terests in the CATV companies they were seeking to serve, the FCC
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking soliciting comment on whether or
not telephone companies should be permitted to provide CATV service,
either on their own or through an affiliate.'
In 1970, the FCC decided that telephone companies and their affili-
ates would be prohibited from providing CATV service within their
telephone service areas. The FCC further decided that any telephone
3. See Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television,
44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77,79 (1981).
4. See id,; General Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846, 850-51 (5th Cir.
1971).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1988). The Communications Act requires that a common carrier
wishing to extend its lines or construct new facilities must first receive a certificate from the
FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 214(a). Section 214 purportedly protects telephone ratepayers from paying
for unnecessary telephone company facilities by providing that the FCC not allow any such
unnecessary facilities to be built and included in the rate base.
6. See General Tel. Co. of Cal., 13 F.C.C.2d 448, 460-61 (1968), affid, 413 F.2d 390
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
7. Applications of Tel. Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities, 34
Fed. Reg. 6290, 6292 (1969)(codified at 47 C.F.R. § 63).
8. Applications of Tel. Companies for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities, 21
F.C.C.2d 307, 325 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Order], affd sub nom. General Tel. Co. of S.W. v.
United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). The ban was then codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.601:
§ 64.601 Furnishing of Facilities for CATV Service to the Viewing Public.
(a) No telephone common carrier subject in whole or in part to the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, shall directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned or controlled by or
under common control with said telephone communications common carrier, engage in the
furnishing of CATV service to the viewing public in its telephone service area.
(b) No telephone common carrier subject in whole or in part to the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, shall provide channels of communications or pole line, conduit space or
other rental arrangements to any entity which is directly or indirectly owned, operated or con-
trolled by or under common control with such telephone communications common carrier,
where such facilities or arrangements are to be used for or in connection with the provision of
CATV service to the viewing public in the service area of the said telephone common carrier.
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company seeking section 214 authorization to provide service to a CATV
company would be required to show that the CATV company was unaf-
filiated before section 214 authorization would be granted.9
In its decision, the FCC found that pole and conduit access was es-
sential to the provision of CATV, and that the telephone companies
controlled the poles and conduits.'0 Because of this control, the FCC de-
termined that telephone companies had the ability to "preempt the
market" for CATV through discriminatory access." Furthermore, ac-
cording to the FCC, the telephone companies had the incentive to extend
their regulated telephone monopoly into the area of CATV service.
Thus, the FCC banned telephone companies from providing CATV
service, fearing that they would exclude competitors from the CATV
market by engaging in discriminatory provision of pole and conduit ac-
cess. The FCC stated that the ban would preserve "a competitive envi-
ronment for the development and use of broadband cable facilities and
services" and avoid the "concentration of control over communications
media." 3
In 1978, Congress passed the Pole Attachment Act 4 which gave the
FCC jurisdiction over the "rates, terms, and conditions for pole attach-
ments." 5 The Pole Attachment Act and implementing regulations 6 ad-
dressed independent CATV operators' fears of discriminatory access to
telephone poles. Further, the cable market had become much stronger
since the initiation of the ban. Thus, three years after the Pole Attachment
Act was enacted, the FCC staff issued a report 7 which noted that the fear
of pole and conduit attachment discrimination did not, "by itself," justify
the cross-ownership ban.'
47 C.F.R. § 64.601 (1971).
9. 1970 Order, supra note 8, at 325.
10. See id. at 324. The FCC noted that CATV systems would have to use the same poles
and conduits as the telephone companies since the communities would not usually permit the
construction of duplicate sets of poles or lines. Id.
11. Id. at324.
12. Id. The FCC pointed out that "numerous parties" had complained that the telephone
companies had, in fact, already discriminated against unaffiliated CATV companies. Id.
13. Id. at 325.
14. Pub. L. No. 95-234, § 6, 92 Stat. 35 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1988)).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1). "The term 'pole attachment' means any attachment by a cable
television system to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility." 47
U.S.C. § 224(a)(4).
16. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1401-.1415 (1994).
17. KENNETH GORDON ET AL., FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC POLICY
ON CABLE OWNERSHIP (1981) (Office of Plans and Policy Staff Report) [hereinafter 1981 Staff
Report). .
18. Id. at 162.
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Nonetheless, the staff recommended that the ban remain in force,
with a new justification: the problem of cross-subsidization. 9 The 1981
Staff Report found that a telephone company could hide cable costs in its
telephone rate base.' ° The fear was that by including cable costs in its
telephone rate base, the telephone company could provide cable service
at a lower cost than independent cable operators. Because the telephone
company could create this artificial cost advantage over independent ca-
ble operators, it would have the ability to price its cable service so low
that the independent cable operators could not compete, possibly leaving
the telephone company with a second monopoly.
B. Congress Makes the Ban Statutory
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984." Section 613(b) of the 1984 Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b),
made the FCC's ban statutory. Section 533(b) tracked the language of the
ban adopted in the 1970 Order, except that the 1984 Act banned a tele-
phone company's provision of all "video programming" over its own
facilities in its service area,' rather than prohibiting only "CATV service,"
as the 1970 Order had.23
The legislative history of the statutory ban is limited. The House
Committee Report states that the intent of section 533(b) was simply "to
codify current FCC rules."'
C. The Executive Agencies Question the Ban's Usefulness
In 1988, the FCC concluded that the telco-cable cross-ownership ban
was constitutional,' but sought comment on whether it should recom-
19. Id. at 175-77.
20. Id. at 153.
21. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988 & Supp. V
1993))(the "1984 AcC').
22. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b)(1) (1991). The 1984 Act defines video programming as "programming
provided by, or generally considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast
station." 47 U.S.C. § 522(16) (1991). The FCC has interpreted video programming as programming
comparable to that being provided by broadcast television stations in 1984. See Telephone Co.-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781, 5820 (1992) (second report and order, recom-
mendation to Congress and second further notice of proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter First Video
Dialtone Order]; Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 10 F.C.C.R. 244, 296-97
(1994)(memorandum opinion and order on reconsideration and third further notice of proposed rule-
making) [hereinafter Second Video Dialtone Order].
23. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.601 (1971).
24. H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4655, 4693. The Committee Report states that § 533, as a whole, was intended "to prevent the
development of local media monopolies and to encourage a diversity of ownership of communica-
tions outlets." Id, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4692.
25. Telephone Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 3 F.C.C.R. 5849, 5864
(1988) (further notice of inquiry and notice of proposed rule making).
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mend that Congress repeal section 533(b) in favor of less restrictive alter-
natives.26 The FCC made this recommendation in 1992.27
In the First Video Dialtone Order, the FCC found that the growth of
the cable industry since 1970 mitigated the danger that the telephone
company " could exclude independent cable television operators from the
cable market.2 The FCC found that with appropriate safeguards, there
would be little risk of anticompetitive conduct."
Among other safeguards, the FCC suggested that telephone compa-
nies should be required to provide video programming through a separate
subsidiary if the FCC determines that this is necessary after a balancing
of the costs and benefits to the public interest." Additionally, the FCC
proposed that telephone companies be allowed to provide video pro-
gramming only through their basic video dialtone platform, which would
provide service to multiple programmers." The FCC further proposed
limiting a telephone company's provision of video programming to a
certain percentage of common carrier capacity.3 These safeguards
would be in addition to the requirement, which also currently exists for
the provision of channel service, that the telephone company provide
the service on a common carrier basis. Furthermore, the FCC found
26. Id.
27. First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 22, at 5847. The video dialtone proceedings
represent somewhat of a new concept in the delivery of video programming. Instead of pro-
viding "channel service" to a single cable operator in an area, a telephone company would
provide a "basic platform," which, taken to its extreme, would amount to a delivery system
much like the current telephone network over which video could be transmitted on a common
carrier basis. See id at n.3, 5797-98, 5811-12. The FCC at least stated that it would try to
avoid premature regulatory classifications, however, in order to allow new services to develop.
See id. at 5812.
28. Competitive entry into the local exchange and exchange access markets may render
"the telephone company" an anachronism. True local competition, if achieved, would provide
the ultimate safeguard against potential local exchange company (LEC) abuses of monopoly
power. To the extent that a LEC's local monopoly diminishes with successful entry of com-
petitive access and competitive exchange service providers, any supposed ability to exclude
independent cable operators decreases.
29. First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 22, at 5848-49.
30. See id. at 5849. The FCC affirmed this recommendation without additional considera-
tion of the proposed safeguards in 1994. Second Video Dialtone Order, supra note 22, at 366-
68.
31. First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 22, at 5847-50.
32. Il at 5850. The FCC counselled against statutorily mandating this or other safeguards,
recommending instead that the FCC have the discretion as to what safeguards should be im-
posed, and when, if ever, those safeguards should be removed. Id at 5850-51.
33. Id. at 5850-51. The FCC stated that a limit of 25%, which Congress was then consid-
ering, was reasonable. Il at 5850-51 n.360.
34. Id. at 5787; see also id. at 5823 ("We conclude that the public interest in preventing
anticompetitive conduct will be served by requiring that our current safeguards designed to
prevent discrimination and cross-subsidization by local telephone companies apply fully to the
provision of services under our video dialtone policy.").
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that the telephone company's entry into the cable market, subject to these
safeguards, would bring public interest benefits by initiating competition
in markets that had, themselves, become increasingly concentrated.35
Other executive agencies reached the same conclusion. In response
to the notice of proposed rulemaking leading up to the First Video Dial-
tone Order, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") submitted comments
advocating that the FCC recommend repeal of section 533(b).36 The DOJ
argued that the potential procompetitive benefits of telephone companies'
competition with cable companies would outweigh potential anticom-
petitive risks.37 The DOJ suggested that the efficiencies gained by
allowing telephone companies to vertically integrate would make it more
likely that such competition would develop. The comments of the Na-
tional Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) also
supported the removal of the ban.39 The NTIA has argued for removal of
the restriction in other reports as well, finding that the dangers of allow-
ing telephone companies to provide video programming were either ex-
aggerated or subject to minimization by the safeguards proposed by the
FCC,' and that competition would be encouraged by the removal of the
ban.4 '
D. The 1992 Cable Act Leaves the Ban Intact
In 1992, Congress overrode President Bush's veto to enact the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (the 1992
Cable Act).42 The 1992 Cable Act, however, did not act on the sugges-
tions of the FCC, the DOJ, and the NTIA to repeal section 533(b).
43 In-
35. See id. at 5850. The FCC had previously found that "the multichannel video market-
place is not as fully competitive as it could be because of the limited presence of alternative
multichannel distribution technologies to provide consumer choice." Id. at 5796 (citing Com-
petition, Rate Deregulation and the Commission's Policies Relating to the Provision of Cable
Television Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 4962, 5002-07 (1990)(report)).
36. L at 5841-42.
37. l at 5842.
38. lHt at 5843, 5849.
39. Il at 5847.
40. See NTIA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE NTIA INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT: TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS IN THE AGE OF INFORMATION 234 (1991).
41. See NTIA, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GLOBALIZATION OF THE MASS MEDIA 144
(1993).
42. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (Supp. V 1993)).
43. Congress has considered removing the ban on numerous occasions, in hearings as well
as bills. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 914-15
nn.9-10 (E.D. Va. 1993) (citing hearings and bills), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
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stead, the Senate Committee Report merely noted that fears of
"anticompetitive abuse" had originally motivated section 533(b).'
II. THE COURTS STRIKE DowN THE BAN
On August 24, 1993, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia struck down the telco-cable cross-ownership ban as a
violation of the First Amendment.4" The Fourth Circuit affirmed. 6 The
Ninth Circuit,47 and district courts in five other jurisdictions,'48 have also
found the ban unconstitutional. This article examines these cases to de-
termine the legal standards to apply to future questions regarding the
FCC's authority to restrict the ability of telephone companies to provide
video programming to subscribers in their service areas.
A. Video Programming Delivered Via Cable is "Speech"
Protected Fully by the First Amendment
As a threshold matter, the sort of communication sought to be pro-
vided by the telcos and prohibited by the telco-cable cross-ownership ban
qualifies as constitutionally protected speech.4'9 A telephone company
seeking to provide video programming would, like a cable company,
"communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety
of formats,"5 by providing self-produced video programming or by
44. S. Rep. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1133, 1150.
45. Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909.
46. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
47. US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379 (9th Cir. December
30, 1994).
48. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); BellSouth Corp.
v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. 93-
323-P-C (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); United States Tel. Ass'n v. United States, No. 1:94CV01961
(D.D.C. Feb. 13, 1995); Southwestern Bell Corp. v. United States, No. 3:94-CV-0193-D (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 27, 1995). See also Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, No. 94-16064, 1994 WL
719063 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1994).
49. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 190; US West, 1994 WL 760379 at *4; BellSouth,
868 F. Supp. at 1338; Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 728. See also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444
(1991).
50. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456 (quoting Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986)). In Turner, cable operators appealed a grant of summary judgement
that the must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. V 1993),
did not violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held that cable programming was
speech that deserved constitutional protection, Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456, and that the must-
carry provisions were subject to intermediate level scrutiny, id. at 2469. The Supreme Court
then reversed the district court, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
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"exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs" to pro-
vide."' Furthermore, while video programming in the form of broadcast
television signals is subject to regulations that would be considered un-
constitutional when applied to other media,52  "the physical
characteristics" of cable transmission "do not require the alteration of
settled [First Amendment] principles."53 Thus, video programming
transmitted via cables is fully protected speech for First Amendment pur-
poses, not subject to the lower protection given to broadcast speech.54
B. Levels of Scrutiny
1. Minimal Scrutiny or Rational-Basis Review
While the lower standard applied to broadcast speech is inapplicable
to cable programming, the government has urged that the telco-cable
cross-ownership ban should be subject to the rational-basis level of scru-
tiny often given to the enforcement of laws of general application that
incidentally burden speech.55
Rational-basis review requires only that a court find that the regula-
tion in question "is rationally related to a legitimate government
objective" before sustaining the regulation's constitutionality.56
Rational-basis review is often applicable in cases where a law of
general operation works, in a specific case, to burden a speaker's First
Amendment rights. Fundamentally, this means that "the press is not im-
whether or not local broadcasting was in jeopardy from cable competition, and whether there
were less restrictive means available to achieve the asserted governmental interests. Id. at 2472.
51. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
52. See id at 2456 ("Our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast
speakers than of speakers in other media."). Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969) and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), with
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
The different treatment of the broadcast media is justified by the so-called scarcity ration-
ale. The scarcity rationale posits that the state is allowed more invasive regulation of broadcast
speech because there is a "inherent physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use
the broadcast medium." Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457. As the Turner court points out, the scarcity
rationale has been subject to much criticism. Id. at 2457 n.5.
53. Turner, 114S. Ct. at 2457.
54. Id. at 2457-58; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181,
191 (4th Cir. 1994); US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379 at *5 (9th
Cir. December 30, 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D.
Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721,730-31 (N.D. 111. 1994).
55. See Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 192; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1338; US
West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'a No. 94-35775,
1994 WL 760379 (9th Cir. December 30, 1994). See also Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 730-31.
56. US West, 855 F. Supp. at 1190.
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mune ... from regulations of general applicability."5 7 In the antitrust
context, Associated Press v. United States" provides an example of such
an application. The Associated Press Court held that the Sherman Anti-
trust Act59 could be enforced against a news distribution organization
comprised of newspaper publishers, despite the organization's arguments
that the enforcement of the Sherman Act would abridge the organiza-
tion's First Amendment rightsf.6
The Turner Court held, however, that rational-basis review is not the
proper standard when the regulation at issue is a law directed specifically
at members of the press, rather than at the population or industry as a
whole."1 Likewise, all of the courts reviewing the telco-cable cross-
ownership ban have rejected the notion that because section 533(b)'s
purpose was, at least in part, to promote competition in the cable televi-
sion market, the statute would only be subject to rational-basis review.62
As in Turner, "some measure of heightened First Amendment scrutiny
{was} demanded" 63 because the telco-cable cross-ownership ban applies
solely to the press and not to all industries generally.
2. Strict Scrutiny
As the government argued for the lowest level of judicial scrutiny,
the telephone companies, not surprisingly, argued that the highest form
of judicial scrutiny should be applied to the telco-cable cross-ownership
ban.6 ' Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the challenged law be
57. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 193 n.17 (citing Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Wailing, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33
(1937)).
58. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
60. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 19-20. See also Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 155 (1951). It may not always be the case, however, that a law of general appli-
cability will be subject to mere rational-basis review. In Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC,
114 S. Ct. 2445, 2458 (1994), the Court stated that "the enforcement of a generally applicable
law may or may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment." The Turner
Court did not specify exactly when the enforcement of a generally applicable law would trigger
heightened scrutiny.
61. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at2458.
62. US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec.
30, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 192 (4th Cir.
1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 731 (N.D. IMI. 1994). See also
BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (rejecting rational-basis
review because the scarcity rationale was inapplicable).
63. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458.
64. See, e.g., US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *5; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1339; Amer-
itech, 867 F. Supp. at 731; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F.
Supp. 909, 922 n.20 (E.D. Va. 1993), aft'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
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"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and... narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."'
Strict scrutiny is applicable in cases involving content-based regula-
tion of speech. 6 The difficult issue is whether or not a ban on telephone
companies' speech (in the form of video programming provided over
transmission facilities owned by the telephone company in its own serv-
ice area) is content-based.
The telco-cable cross-ownership ban is not content-based on its
face." Section 533(b) makes no mention of what messages are being
provided except to say that they are in the form of video programming.6
And while the ban certainly differentiates among speakers, there is no
indication that the ban distinguishes speakers based on the
"[g]overnment's preference for the substance of what the favored speak-
ers have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to
say)," as required by Turner to classify a speaker-partial law as content-
based.'
On the facts of Turner, it could be argued that the Court was mis-
taken in finding that the must-carry rules were not content-based. The
Turner court found it unproblematic that Congress preferred broadcasters
to cable programmers, even though the broadcast programmers are sub-
ject to greater government intrusion on the content of their speech than
the cable programmers burdened by the must-carry rules.' The Court
65. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
66. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458-59; Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989); Bur-
son v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850-51 (1992). See also R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2542 (1992)("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
67. US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379, at *5 (9th Cir. Dec.
30, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 194 (4th Cir.
1994).
68. In Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), the district court found that the determination of
whether a particular message qualifies as video programming, rather than some other form of
programming, required reference to the content of the programming, and therefore that the ban
was content-based. Id. at 922-23. The court of appeals disagreed, stating "that a regulation
requires some examination of the speech upon which it has impact does not make the regulation
content-based." Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 193. The court of appeals found that the
telco-cable cross-ownership ban was "not content-based because, in determining whether
'video programming' is being transmitted, 'the Government does not need to evaluate the na-
ture of the message being imparted."' Id. at 194-95 (quoting Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 656
(1984)).
69. See Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 195 (quoting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2467). The
fact that the affected group of speakers turns out to be small does not necessarily mean that
strict scrutiny is required. See id. at 197; US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *6.
70. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462-63. In addition to emphasizing its belief that the must-
carry provisions were not intended to favor the content of broadcasters' speech, the court
minimized the extent to which the FCC is permitted to regulate the content of broadcast pro-
gramming. Id. at 2462-64.
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also dismissed the arguments of the cable operators, and of Justice
O'Connor's partial dissent7' and Justice Ginsburg's partial dissent,72 that
the many statements in the legislative history of the 1992 Cable Act indi-
cate that Congress saw locally-oriented programming as beneficial and
deserving of protection."
These issues, however, are not present with respect to the telco-cable
cross-ownership ban. Cable companies are, in general, subject to no
greater government regulation of content than telephone companies, and
no suggestion has been seriously made that programming provided by
cable operators would be any different, not to mention more attractive to
the government, than that provided by telephone companies.
Strict scrutiny is also triggered when there is evidence that the gov-
ernment had an "improper censorial motive" in enacting the regulation.74
None of the reviewing courts found such a motive in Congress' or the
FCC's enactment of the telco-cable cross-ownership ban.75 The courts
found no evidence to suggest that Congress was motivated by a desire to
suppress the message that telephone companies might provide, rather
than by a desire to achieve economic goals not related to the content of
the speech. Thus, the telco-cable cross-ownership ban is not subject to
strict scrutiny analysis.
3. Intermediate-Level Scrutiny
Turner reaffirmed the principle that laws that "single out the press"
must be subjected to "some degree of heightened First Amendment scru-
tiny."76 If the law is not subjected to strict scrutiny or rationale-basis
review, then the intermediate scrutiny test applies.' Courts use interme-
diate scrutiny when a content-neutral regulation burdens speech.78
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, a content-neutral regulation
which burdens speech must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant
71. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2476-79 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
72. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
73. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2462.
74. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987). See also Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2544
(1992).
75. See, e.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379, at *6 (9th
Cir. Dec. 30, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 197
(4th Cir. 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
76. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458 (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 228).
77. See US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *7.
78. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 799; United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984).
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government interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information. 79 As the Turner court expressed,
a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if "it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."80
The Court has recognized that these two tests are essentially the
same." Application of intermediate scrutiny to the telco-cable cross-
ownership ban requires the courts to answer (1) whether the ban serves a
significant, important or substantial government interest, and (2) whether
the ban is narrowly tailored, or no greater than necessary, to further the
purported interest. The next section describes the courts' responses to
these issues.
C. Application of the Intermediate Scrutiny Test
1. Does the Ban Serve a Significant Government Interest?
The government put forth a number of justifications for the telco-
cable cross ownership ban. As discussed earlier, the original reason for
the ban was the fear that the telephone company would use its
"gatekeeper" function over the telephone poles to disadvantage inde-
pendent CATV operators. 82 Another justification was that the telephone
companies' provision of video programming would create opportunities
for cross-subsidization.83 A third justification was that the telco-cable
cross-ownership ban promotes diversity in the provision of video pro-
gramming.' No court questioned the government's assertion that these
79. Clark, 468 U.S. at 291,293.
80. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
81. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1800 (1993).
82. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 19, 20 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *10; Chesapeake &,Potomac Tel. Co. of Va.
v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 188(4th Cir. 1994). 47 C.F.R. § 63.57 allows a telephone com-
pany to provide "channel service" (video distribution) to independent cable companies so long
as the telephone company can demonstrate that it made pole attachment rights available to the
cable system at reasonable, nondiscriminatory charges and terms. 47 C.F.R. § 63.57 (1985).
See also Indiana Telephone Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 824 F.2d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(cross-
ownership rule does not prohibit a telephone company from owning channel distribution facili-
ties and using them "to transmit television signals for independent cable operators").
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were all significant governmental interests."5 However, the courts did
question whether or not the purported interests were actually served.
a. Pole Access
The government has claimed that the ban restricts the incentive of a
telephone company to engage in the provision of discriminatory access to
telephone poles and conduits. All of the cases question whether or not
this fear is addressed by the ban. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in the US West case suggests that because video transport is allowed
by the ban,86 the ban does nothing to prevent incentives for pole and con-
duit access discrimination.8Y The telephone company, even with the ban,
has the ability to engage in pole access discrimination and could, there-
fore, under the government's theory, monopolize the video transport
market.88 The court of appeals in Chesapeake & Potomac focused on the
more narrow alternatives available to the government, such as the Pole
Attachment Act, or even stronger legislative prohibitions against dis-
crimination if the Pole Attachment Act could not entirely guarantee non-
discriminatory access."9 The BellSouth court noted that the FCC had al-
ready rejected the need for a complete ban,90 and pointed out that at this
point the cable industry has "become entrenched firmly in communi-
ties." Discriminatory access to telephone poles and conduits is a threat
only to those who cannot provide video programming through other
means, such as, (1) through poles and conduits not controlled by the lo-
cal telephone company, or (2) through the use of other technologies.
While prospects for non-LEC provision of pole and conduit access do
exist, the most promising possibility lies in other distribution technolo-
gies. Broadcast television stations, of course, have been providing video
programming without the use of telephone poles ever since video pro-
gramming could be delivered to a viewer's home at all. Other
technologies such as direct broadcast satellite (DBS) and "wireless ca-
ble," and even VCRs and laser videodiscs, have already minimized any
85. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d. at 199 ("There can be no question, then,
but that the interests Section 533(b) serves are 'significant."'); Ameritech Corp. v. United
States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 734 (N.D. 1111994). The US West court could not discern any Con-
gressional intent, but found that the interests suggested by the FCC and DOJ were important.
US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *9.
86. See First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 22 at 5787.
87. See US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *10.
88. Id.
89. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 200 (quoting Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of
Va v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 930 n.9). See also Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 736 n.8
(following Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 721, regarding pole attachments).
90. BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1343 (N.D. M11. 994).
91. Id.
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potential threat of (harmful) discriminatory pole access. Emerging tech-
nologies will blunt this alleged threat further.
b. Cross-Subsidization
Another governmental interest advanced was that the ban is neces-
sary to protect against cross-subsidization. As the appellate courts
observed, it is difficult to believe that a telephone company could engage
in cross-subsidization with respect to its provision of video program-
ming, as opposed to video transport.9 The salaries of writers, actors,
producers, directors and, so forth, could not likely be hidden in the ac-
counts for local telephone service. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any
costs associated with the production of video programming that would
resemble those of local telephone service. For the sake of argument, the
BellSouth court, however, did accept the possibility that cross-
subsidization might be more likely to occur when a telephone company
was allowed to provide video programming due to greater incentives to
monopolize the industry." Still, the court noted that the FCC already has
in place a regulatory scheme designed to prevent anticompetitive actions
by LECs, such as accounting safeguards, and also pointed out that these
regulations could be strengthened." Further, the BellSouth court found
that alternatives advanced by the FCC in its First Video Dialtone Order,
such as structural separation and providing that a telephone company's
provision of video programming be limited to a percentage of common
carrier capacity, would be less burdensome on the telephone companies'
speech.'5
The Ameritech court also considered the possibility that a telephone
company's ability to provide video programming might increase the in-
centives of the telco to cross-subsidize, but found that the statements in
favor of repeal by the FCC and the DOJ undercut the government's posi-
tions.'6 Not surprisingly, it proved difficult for the FCC and DOJ to argue
for the ban on the grounds that it promoted competition after having pre-
92. See US West, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-35775, 1994 WL 760379, at *11 (9th Cir.
Dec. 30, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 200.
93. BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1342.
94. Id. (citing First Video Dialtone Order, supra note 22, at 5828).
95. Id. at 1342-43. These less restrictive alternatives are discussed supra 11-13 and note
27. The BellSouth court further suggested the possibility that even less restrictive alternatives to
these might be found. The court did not find that any of these regulations were sustainable
under an intermediate scrutiny analysis. Rather the court merely noted that there were substan-
tially less restrictive alternatives.
96. See Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721,734-36 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The
statements by the FCC and DOT, as well as by the NTIA, are discussed supra 14.
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viously argued against the ban on the grounds that it harmed competi-
tion.
c. Fostering Diversity or Thwarting Monopolistic Tendencies
As two courts pointed out, the robust economic health of the cable
television industry made claims that the telephone company would mo-
nopolize the provision of video programming doubtful.97 What once
might have been a sufficient reason for the ban has since changed, as the
cable industry has grown enormously since the ban was first imple-
mented, and now passes by over 90% of the homes in the United States.9'
Again, the statements of the DOJ and the FCC regarding the anticom-
petitive impact of the ban, coupled with the fact that Congress never
made any definitive findings with respect to the ban, caused courts to
seriously question whether or not the ban had the effect of preventing
monopolies.99 None of the courts considering this question found that the
government could show, even when viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to it, that the telco-cable cross-ownership ban was nar-
rowly tailored to promote the government's purported interest in
promoting diversity in the provision of video programming and in pre-
venting a monopoly in that market. 00 BellSouth pointed out that the ban
may actually diminish diversity because telephone companies are pre-
cluded from competing with the cable monopolists in the telephone
companies' service areas.'01
D. The Telco-Cable Cross Ownership Ban Fails the
Intermediate Scrutiny Test
No court could find that the ban was a narrowly tailored means of
promoting the government interests."° Therefore, the ban was struck
down by each court to which it was presented.,0 At present, nearly all the
telephone companies have an injunction prohibiting the government
97. See US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *10; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1341.
98. See BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1341.
99. See, e.g., BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1341 n.9; Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 734-35.
100. See US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *11; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1342. See also
Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 736.
101. See BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1341.
102. US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *14; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v.
United States, 42 F.3d at 202; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1344; Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 736.
103. See US West, 1994 WL 760379, at *14; Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 185;
BellSouth 868 F. Supp. at 1344; Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 737. See also NYNEX Corp. v.
United States, No. 93-323-P-C (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994), United States Tel. Assoc. v. United
States, No. 1:94CV01961 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 1995).
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from enforcing the ban against them. 4 The FCC announced that it would
not enforce the ban against any company that was a party in one of the
cases where an injunction against the FCC's enforcement was issued or




While the unconstitutionality of an outright ban against telephone
companies' provision of video programming in their service areas ap-
pears to be beyond question,1" 6 the question of how other, less restrictive
regulations will be treated remains open.
The FCC has initiated proceedings seeking comment on, inter alia,
how it should alter its video dialtone regulations to reflect the entry of
telephone companies into the video programming market."° In the
Fourth Further NPRM, the FCC proposes a number of "safeguards,"
many of which burden the provision of video programming by telephone
companies. '
For example, the FCC seeks comment on whether it should allow
telephone companies to provide video programming only over video
dialtone platforms."° This requirement would prevent a telephone com-
pany from operating a traditional-style cable system in its service area, as
well as prohibit it from acquiring the existing facilities of a cable com-
pany operating within the telephone company's service area.
104. The companies that are parties to suits in which an injunction has been issued in-
clude Bell Atlantic, US West, BellSouth, Ameritech, NYNEX, GTE, SBC Communications
(formerly Southwestern Bell) and most members of the United States Telephone Association
("USTA"). SNET is the major exception, having not participated in the USTA suit. See cases
cited supra note 2.
105. Comm'n Announces Enforcement Policy Regarding Tel. Co. Ownership of Cable
Television Sys., DA 95-520 (FCC Apr. 3, 1995) (public notice).
106. A number of the decisions discussed in this article are pending further review. While
it does not appear likely, subsequent Supreme Court or appellate decisions could, of course,
reverse the decisions.
107. Tel. Co.-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 60 Fed. Reg. 8996 (1995) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. § 63) (proposed Feb. 16, 1995) (fourth further notice of proposed rle-
making) [hereinafter Fourth Further NPRM].
108. The FCC continues to require telephone companies to obtain § 214 approval, see su-
pra note 4 and accompanying text, prior to constructing or acquiring cable or video dialtone
systems in their service areas. Comm'n Announces Enforcement Policy Regarding Tel. Co.
Ownership of Cable Television Sys., DA 95-520 (FCC Apr. 3, 1995)(public notice). The FCC
also states that any § 214 certificates "granted will be conditioned on the outcome of the
{Fourth Further NPRMI." Id.
109. Fourth Further NPRM, supra note 107, at 8997.
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This sort of prohibition would burden a telephone company's ability
to provide video programming in the manner it finds most advantageous,
without banning the provision of video programming outright. Because it
infringes to some degree on the telephone companies' First Amendment
interests, any regulation along these lines will be subject to some amount
of review.
Since this regulation is not applicable to the industry generally (quite
obviously, since a cable company can operate a traditional cable system),
the regulation would be subject to heightened scrutiny. Such a regulation
would also be no more content-based than the cross-ownership ban, and
therefore would not be subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, a regulation pro-
hibiting telephone companies from providing video programming via a
traditional cable system, like most of the other possible regulations sug-
gested in the Fourth Further NPRM, would be subject to the same
intermediate-level scrutiny as the telco-cable cross-ownership ban itself.
The results, however, could be quite different, and will certainly de-
pend on the particular regulations actually implemented by the FCC. In
addition to the proposal mentioned above, the FCC has also discussed a
wide variety of other "safeguards.""' These safeguards include limiting
telephone companies to a certain percentage of their common carrier
platform's capacity, regulations regarding non-discriminatory access to
technical network information and customer proprietary network infor-
mation (CPNl),"' structural separation,"' and others.
The cases striking down the ban left the possibility for less restrictive
regulation wide open, and did not comment on whether or not any of the
less restrictive regulations would be constitutional. The mere mention of
a less restrictive alternative, however, hardly amounts to a judicial de-
termination that the alternative is constitutional. Indeed, the court of
appeals in Chesapeake & Potomac specifically pointed out that it was not
passing on the constitutionality of anything except the ban."3
Nonetheless, the cases striking down the cross-ownership ban do il-
lustrate the most likely framework for how regulations emerging from
the Fourth Further NPRM will be evaluated by the courts: are the regu-
lations narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest? A
ban on acquisitions to advance the FCC's two-wire policy will be evalu-
ated on (1) whether the two-wire policy is a substantial governmental
110. Id. at8998-9000.
111. Id. at 8999.
112. Id.at9000.
113. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 202 n.34 (4th
Cir. 1994).
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interest,114 (2) whether the ban on acquisitions actually serves the pur-
ported interest, and (3) whether the ban on acquisitions is narrowly
tailored.
The regulations proposed by the Fourth Further NPRM will proba-
bly be justified by reference to the same governmental interests which
supported the ban. Whether or not the restrictions serve the ban, and
whether or not they are narrowly drawn will prove difficult questions
which will not be resolved without reference to the provisions and effects
of the regulations actually promulgated. An inquiry will necessitate a
fact-specific analysis of the regulations in order to determine how nar-
rowly drawn they are and whether they actually serve one or more of the
purported government interests. It is likely, however, that the more bur-
densome any particular restriction is on a telephone company's provision
of video programming, the more difficult it will be for the government to
show that it is narrowly drawn.
Limiting a telephone company's provision of video programming to
a specified percentage of common carrier capacity would probably be
more suspect than a requirement of structural separation. The percentage
limit prohibits a telephone company from engaging in a particular type of
speech at a certain point. Structural separation, on the other hand, while
perhaps placing some burden on speech by increasing the costs of pro-
viding video programming by limiting economies of scope, does not, at
any point, prohibit programming. Structural separation is more narrowly
drawn because it focuses on the telephone company's corporate structure
instead of its speech.
Requiring non-discriminatory access and confidential treatment of
CPNI in video dialtone platforms presents a different issue. If the tele-
phone company elects common carrier treatment of its provision of video
dialtone, there is little chance that the non-discriminatory access and con-
fidential treatment of CPNI will be considered overly burdensome. If the
telephone company does not wish to operate under these typical common
carrier obligations, allowing it to operate as a traditional cable system
would allow it to avoid them. However, if the telephone company is re-
quired to provide video programming under the common carrier model,
the requirement of nondiscriminatory access may prove too great a re-
striction, as such a requirement would prohibit any editorial discretion
which might be exercised by the telephone company.'
5
114. The two-wire policy may not, itself, be a substantial government interest. Instead,
the governmental interest may be more broadly stated as an interest in encouraging multiple
providers of video programming. Stating the governmental interest in this manner greatly in-
creases the number of potentially less restrictive alternatives.
115. Confidential treatment of CPNI is less obviously a restriction on the telephone com-
pany's speech than non-discriminatory access. While it may force the telephone company to
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In addition to providing a framework for future regulation of video
programming provided by a telephone company, the cases striking down
the cross-ownership ban help to drive home the federal courts' shift away
from medium-based First Amendment standards. Although broadcast
remains subject to more intrusive regulation,'1 6 cable, print, video dial-
tone, and most other communications media are being evaluated under
the same standards. Application of these standards may vary somewhat
due to the factual situations (such as market conditions and technical
properties), but these variations only matter insofar as they relate to the
government's goals or the feasibility of more or less narrow regulation.
These cases indicate that courts may be moving towards an accep-
tance of the idea that technological advances should not, at least on their
own, bring about new and discrete areas of First Amendment jurispru-
dence.
forgo revenues from joint marketing operations (while no similar restriction adheres to all pro-
viders of video programming), the requirement does not seem overly burdensome.
116. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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